| 1 | /* Copyright 2016 OpenMarket Ltd |
| 2 | * |
| 3 | * Licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 (the "License"); |
| 4 | * you may not use this file except in compliance with the License. |
| 5 | * You may obtain a copy of the License at |
| 6 | * |
| 7 | * http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0 |
| 8 | * |
| 9 | * Unless required by applicable law or agreed to in writing, software |
| 10 | * distributed under the License is distributed on an "AS IS" BASIS, |
| 11 | * WITHOUT WARRANTIES OR CONDITIONS OF ANY KIND, either express or implied. |
| 12 | * See the License for the specific language governing permissions and |
| 13 | * limitations under the License. |
| 14 | */ |
| 15 | |
| 16 | #include "olm/inbound_group_session.h" |
| 17 | |
| 18 | #include <string.h> |
| 19 | |
| 20 | #include "olm/base64.h" |
| 21 | #include "olm/cipher.h" |
| 22 | #include "olm/crypto.h" |
| 23 | #include "olm/error.h" |
| 24 | #include "olm/megolm.h" |
| 25 | #include "olm/memory.h" |
| 26 | #include "olm/message.h" |
| 27 | #include "olm/pickle.h" |
| 28 | #include "olm/pickle_encoding.h" |
| 29 | |
| 30 | |
| 31 | #define OLM_PROTOCOL_VERSION 3 |
| 32 | #define GROUP_SESSION_ID_LENGTH ED25519_PUBLIC_KEY_LENGTH |
| 33 | #define PICKLE_VERSION 2 |
| 34 | #define SESSION_KEY_VERSION 2 |
| 35 | #define SESSION_EXPORT_VERSION 1 |
| 36 | |
| 37 | struct OlmInboundGroupSession { |
| 38 | /** our earliest known ratchet value */ |
| 39 | Megolm initial_ratchet; |
| 40 | |
| 41 | /** The most recent ratchet value */ |
| 42 | Megolm latest_ratchet; |
| 43 | |
| 44 | /** The ed25519 signing key */ |
| 45 | struct _olm_ed25519_public_key signing_key; |
| 46 | |
| 47 | /** |
| 48 | * Have we ever seen any evidence that this is a valid session? |
| 49 | * (either because the original session share was signed, or because we |
| 50 | * have subsequently successfully decrypted a message) |
| 51 | * |
| 52 | * (We don't do anything with this currently, but we may want to bear it in |
| 53 | * mind when we consider handling key-shares for sessions we already know |
| 54 | * about.) |
| 55 | */ |
| 56 | int signing_key_verified; |
| 57 | |
| 58 | enum OlmErrorCode last_error; |
| 59 | }; |
| 60 | |
| 61 | size_t olm_inbound_group_session_size(void) { |
| 62 | return sizeof(OlmInboundGroupSession); |
| 63 | } |
| 64 | |
| 65 | OlmInboundGroupSession * olm_inbound_group_session( |
| 66 | void *memory |
| 67 | ) { |
| 68 | OlmInboundGroupSession *session = memory; |
| 69 | olm_clear_inbound_group_session(session); |
| 70 | return session; |
| 71 | } |
| 72 | |
| 73 | const char *olm_inbound_group_session_last_error( |
| 74 | const OlmInboundGroupSession *session |
| 75 | ) { |
| 76 | return _olm_error_to_string(error: session->last_error); |
| 77 | } |
| 78 | |
| 79 | enum OlmErrorCode olm_inbound_group_session_last_error_code( |
| 80 | const OlmInboundGroupSession *session |
| 81 | ) { |
| 82 | return session->last_error; |
| 83 | } |
| 84 | |
| 85 | size_t olm_clear_inbound_group_session( |
| 86 | OlmInboundGroupSession *session |
| 87 | ) { |
| 88 | _olm_unset(buffer: session, buffer_length: sizeof(OlmInboundGroupSession)); |
| 89 | return sizeof(OlmInboundGroupSession); |
| 90 | } |
| 91 | |
| 92 | #define SESSION_EXPORT_RAW_LENGTH \ |
| 93 | (1 + 4 + MEGOLM_RATCHET_LENGTH + ED25519_PUBLIC_KEY_LENGTH) |
| 94 | |
| 95 | #define SESSION_KEY_RAW_LENGTH \ |
| 96 | (1 + 4 + MEGOLM_RATCHET_LENGTH + ED25519_PUBLIC_KEY_LENGTH\ |
| 97 | + ED25519_SIGNATURE_LENGTH) |
| 98 | |
| 99 | static size_t _init_group_session_keys( |
| 100 | OlmInboundGroupSession *session, |
| 101 | const uint8_t *key_buf, |
| 102 | int export_format |
| 103 | ) { |
| 104 | const uint8_t expected_version = |
| 105 | (export_format ? SESSION_EXPORT_VERSION : SESSION_KEY_VERSION); |
| 106 | const uint8_t *ptr = key_buf; |
| 107 | size_t version = *ptr++; |
| 108 | |
| 109 | if (version != expected_version) { |
| 110 | session->last_error = OLM_BAD_SESSION_KEY; |
| 111 | return (size_t)-1; |
| 112 | } |
| 113 | |
| 114 | uint32_t counter = 0; |
| 115 | // Decode counter as a big endian 32-bit number. |
| 116 | for (unsigned i = 0; i < 4; i++) { |
| 117 | counter <<= 8; counter |= *ptr++; |
| 118 | } |
| 119 | |
| 120 | megolm_init(megolm: &session->initial_ratchet, random_data: ptr, counter); |
| 121 | megolm_init(megolm: &session->latest_ratchet, random_data: ptr, counter); |
| 122 | |
| 123 | ptr += MEGOLM_RATCHET_LENGTH; |
| 124 | memcpy( |
| 125 | dest: session->signing_key.public_key, src: ptr, ED25519_PUBLIC_KEY_LENGTH |
| 126 | ); |
| 127 | ptr += ED25519_PUBLIC_KEY_LENGTH; |
| 128 | |
| 129 | if (!export_format) { |
| 130 | if (!_olm_crypto_ed25519_verify(their_key: &session->signing_key, message: key_buf, |
| 131 | message_length: ptr - key_buf, signature: ptr)) { |
| 132 | session->last_error = OLM_BAD_SIGNATURE; |
| 133 | return (size_t)-1; |
| 134 | } |
| 135 | |
| 136 | /* signed keyshare */ |
| 137 | session->signing_key_verified = 1; |
| 138 | } |
| 139 | return 0; |
| 140 | } |
| 141 | |
| 142 | size_t olm_init_inbound_group_session( |
| 143 | OlmInboundGroupSession *session, |
| 144 | const uint8_t * session_key, size_t session_key_length |
| 145 | ) { |
| 146 | uint8_t key_buf[SESSION_KEY_RAW_LENGTH]; |
| 147 | size_t raw_length = _olm_decode_base64_length(input_length: session_key_length); |
| 148 | size_t result; |
| 149 | |
| 150 | if (raw_length == (size_t)-1) { |
| 151 | session->last_error = OLM_INVALID_BASE64; |
| 152 | return (size_t)-1; |
| 153 | } |
| 154 | |
| 155 | if (raw_length != SESSION_KEY_RAW_LENGTH) { |
| 156 | session->last_error = OLM_BAD_SESSION_KEY; |
| 157 | return (size_t)-1; |
| 158 | } |
| 159 | |
| 160 | _olm_decode_base64(input: session_key, input_length: session_key_length, output: key_buf); |
| 161 | result = _init_group_session_keys(session, key_buf, export_format: 0); |
| 162 | _olm_unset(buffer: key_buf, SESSION_KEY_RAW_LENGTH); |
| 163 | return result; |
| 164 | } |
| 165 | |
| 166 | size_t olm_import_inbound_group_session( |
| 167 | OlmInboundGroupSession *session, |
| 168 | const uint8_t * session_key, size_t session_key_length |
| 169 | ) { |
| 170 | uint8_t key_buf[SESSION_EXPORT_RAW_LENGTH]; |
| 171 | size_t raw_length = _olm_decode_base64_length(input_length: session_key_length); |
| 172 | size_t result; |
| 173 | |
| 174 | if (raw_length == (size_t)-1) { |
| 175 | session->last_error = OLM_INVALID_BASE64; |
| 176 | return (size_t)-1; |
| 177 | } |
| 178 | |
| 179 | if (raw_length != SESSION_EXPORT_RAW_LENGTH) { |
| 180 | session->last_error = OLM_BAD_SESSION_KEY; |
| 181 | return (size_t)-1; |
| 182 | } |
| 183 | |
| 184 | _olm_decode_base64(input: session_key, input_length: session_key_length, output: key_buf); |
| 185 | result = _init_group_session_keys(session, key_buf, export_format: 1); |
| 186 | _olm_unset(buffer: key_buf, SESSION_EXPORT_RAW_LENGTH); |
| 187 | return result; |
| 188 | } |
| 189 | |
| 190 | static size_t raw_pickle_length( |
| 191 | const OlmInboundGroupSession *session |
| 192 | ) { |
| 193 | size_t length = 0; |
| 194 | length += _olm_pickle_uint32_length(PICKLE_VERSION); |
| 195 | length += megolm_pickle_length(megolm: &session->initial_ratchet); |
| 196 | length += megolm_pickle_length(megolm: &session->latest_ratchet); |
| 197 | length += _olm_pickle_ed25519_public_key_length(value: &session->signing_key); |
| 198 | length += _olm_pickle_bool_length(session->signing_key_verified); |
| 199 | return length; |
| 200 | } |
| 201 | |
| 202 | size_t olm_pickle_inbound_group_session_length( |
| 203 | const OlmInboundGroupSession *session |
| 204 | ) { |
| 205 | return _olm_enc_output_length(raw_length: raw_pickle_length(session)); |
| 206 | } |
| 207 | |
| 208 | size_t olm_pickle_inbound_group_session( |
| 209 | OlmInboundGroupSession *session, |
| 210 | void const * key, size_t key_length, |
| 211 | void * pickled, size_t pickled_length |
| 212 | ) { |
| 213 | size_t raw_length = raw_pickle_length(session); |
| 214 | uint8_t *pos; |
| 215 | |
| 216 | if (pickled_length < _olm_enc_output_length(raw_length)) { |
| 217 | session->last_error = OLM_OUTPUT_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL; |
| 218 | return (size_t)-1; |
| 219 | } |
| 220 | |
| 221 | pos = _olm_enc_output_pos(output: pickled, raw_length); |
| 222 | pos = _olm_pickle_uint32(pos, PICKLE_VERSION); |
| 223 | pos = megolm_pickle(megolm: &session->initial_ratchet, pos); |
| 224 | pos = megolm_pickle(megolm: &session->latest_ratchet, pos); |
| 225 | pos = _olm_pickle_ed25519_public_key(pos, value: &session->signing_key); |
| 226 | pos = _olm_pickle_bool(pos, value: session->signing_key_verified); |
| 227 | |
| 228 | return _olm_enc_output(key, key_length, pickle: pickled, raw_length); |
| 229 | } |
| 230 | |
| 231 | size_t olm_unpickle_inbound_group_session( |
| 232 | OlmInboundGroupSession *session, |
| 233 | void const * key, size_t key_length, |
| 234 | void * pickled, size_t pickled_length |
| 235 | ) { |
| 236 | const uint8_t *pos; |
| 237 | const uint8_t *end; |
| 238 | uint32_t pickle_version; |
| 239 | |
| 240 | size_t raw_length = _olm_enc_input( |
| 241 | key, key_length, input: pickled, b64_length: pickled_length, last_error: &(session->last_error) |
| 242 | ); |
| 243 | if (raw_length == (size_t)-1) { |
| 244 | return raw_length; |
| 245 | } |
| 246 | |
| 247 | pos = pickled; |
| 248 | end = pos + raw_length; |
| 249 | |
| 250 | pos = _olm_unpickle_uint32(pos, end, value: &pickle_version); |
| 251 | FAIL_ON_CORRUPTED_PICKLE(pos, session); |
| 252 | |
| 253 | if (pickle_version < 1 || pickle_version > PICKLE_VERSION) { |
| 254 | session->last_error = OLM_UNKNOWN_PICKLE_VERSION; |
| 255 | return (size_t)-1; |
| 256 | } |
| 257 | |
| 258 | pos = megolm_unpickle(megolm: &session->initial_ratchet, pos, end); |
| 259 | FAIL_ON_CORRUPTED_PICKLE(pos, session); |
| 260 | |
| 261 | pos = megolm_unpickle(megolm: &session->latest_ratchet, pos, end); |
| 262 | FAIL_ON_CORRUPTED_PICKLE(pos, session); |
| 263 | |
| 264 | pos = _olm_unpickle_ed25519_public_key(pos, end, value: &session->signing_key); |
| 265 | FAIL_ON_CORRUPTED_PICKLE(pos, session); |
| 266 | |
| 267 | if (pickle_version == 1) { |
| 268 | /* pickle v1 had no signing_key_verified field (all keyshares were |
| 269 | * verified at import time) */ |
| 270 | session->signing_key_verified = 1; |
| 271 | } else { |
| 272 | pos = _olm_unpickle_bool(pos, end, value: &(session->signing_key_verified)); |
| 273 | } |
| 274 | FAIL_ON_CORRUPTED_PICKLE(pos, session); |
| 275 | |
| 276 | if (pos != end) { |
| 277 | /* Input was longer than expected. */ |
| 278 | session->last_error = OLM_PICKLE_EXTRA_DATA; |
| 279 | return (size_t)-1; |
| 280 | } |
| 281 | |
| 282 | return pickled_length; |
| 283 | } |
| 284 | |
| 285 | /** |
| 286 | * get the max plaintext length in an un-base64-ed message |
| 287 | */ |
| 288 | static size_t _decrypt_max_plaintext_length( |
| 289 | OlmInboundGroupSession *session, |
| 290 | uint8_t * message, size_t message_length |
| 291 | ) { |
| 292 | struct _OlmDecodeGroupMessageResults decoded_results; |
| 293 | |
| 294 | _olm_decode_group_message( |
| 295 | input: message, input_length: message_length, |
| 296 | mac_length: megolm_cipher->ops->mac_length(megolm_cipher), |
| 297 | ED25519_SIGNATURE_LENGTH, |
| 298 | results: &decoded_results); |
| 299 | |
| 300 | if (decoded_results.version != OLM_PROTOCOL_VERSION) { |
| 301 | session->last_error = OLM_BAD_MESSAGE_VERSION; |
| 302 | return (size_t)-1; |
| 303 | } |
| 304 | |
| 305 | if (!decoded_results.ciphertext) { |
| 306 | session->last_error = OLM_BAD_MESSAGE_FORMAT; |
| 307 | return (size_t)-1; |
| 308 | } |
| 309 | |
| 310 | return megolm_cipher->ops->decrypt_max_plaintext_length( |
| 311 | megolm_cipher, decoded_results.ciphertext_length); |
| 312 | } |
| 313 | |
| 314 | size_t olm_group_decrypt_max_plaintext_length( |
| 315 | OlmInboundGroupSession *session, |
| 316 | uint8_t * message, size_t message_length |
| 317 | ) { |
| 318 | size_t raw_length; |
| 319 | |
| 320 | raw_length = _olm_decode_base64(input: message, input_length: message_length, output: message); |
| 321 | if (raw_length == (size_t)-1) { |
| 322 | session->last_error = OLM_INVALID_BASE64; |
| 323 | return (size_t)-1; |
| 324 | } |
| 325 | |
| 326 | return _decrypt_max_plaintext_length( |
| 327 | session, message, message_length: raw_length |
| 328 | ); |
| 329 | } |
| 330 | |
| 331 | /** |
| 332 | * get a copy of the megolm ratchet, advanced |
| 333 | * to the relevant index. Returns 0 on success, -1 on error |
| 334 | */ |
| 335 | static size_t _get_megolm( |
| 336 | OlmInboundGroupSession *session, uint32_t message_index, Megolm *result |
| 337 | ) { |
| 338 | /* pick a megolm instance to use. If we're at or beyond the latest ratchet |
| 339 | * value, use that */ |
| 340 | if ((message_index - session->latest_ratchet.counter) < (1U << 31)) { |
| 341 | megolm_advance_to(megolm: &session->latest_ratchet, advance_to: message_index); |
| 342 | *result = session->latest_ratchet; |
| 343 | return 0; |
| 344 | } else if ((message_index - session->initial_ratchet.counter) >= (1U << 31)) { |
| 345 | /* the counter is before our intial ratchet - we can't decode this. */ |
| 346 | session->last_error = OLM_UNKNOWN_MESSAGE_INDEX; |
| 347 | return (size_t)-1; |
| 348 | } else { |
| 349 | /* otherwise, start from the initial megolm. Take a copy so that we |
| 350 | * don't overwrite the initial megolm */ |
| 351 | *result = session->initial_ratchet; |
| 352 | megolm_advance_to(megolm: result, advance_to: message_index); |
| 353 | return 0; |
| 354 | } |
| 355 | } |
| 356 | |
| 357 | /** |
| 358 | * decrypt an un-base64-ed message |
| 359 | */ |
| 360 | static size_t _decrypt( |
| 361 | OlmInboundGroupSession *session, |
| 362 | uint8_t * message, size_t message_length, |
| 363 | uint8_t * plaintext, size_t max_plaintext_length, |
| 364 | uint32_t * message_index |
| 365 | ) { |
| 366 | struct _OlmDecodeGroupMessageResults decoded_results; |
| 367 | size_t max_length, r; |
| 368 | Megolm megolm; |
| 369 | |
| 370 | _olm_decode_group_message( |
| 371 | input: message, input_length: message_length, |
| 372 | mac_length: megolm_cipher->ops->mac_length(megolm_cipher), |
| 373 | ED25519_SIGNATURE_LENGTH, |
| 374 | results: &decoded_results); |
| 375 | |
| 376 | if (decoded_results.version != OLM_PROTOCOL_VERSION) { |
| 377 | session->last_error = OLM_BAD_MESSAGE_VERSION; |
| 378 | return (size_t)-1; |
| 379 | } |
| 380 | |
| 381 | if (!decoded_results.has_message_index || !decoded_results.ciphertext) { |
| 382 | session->last_error = OLM_BAD_MESSAGE_FORMAT; |
| 383 | return (size_t)-1; |
| 384 | } |
| 385 | |
| 386 | if (message_index != NULL) { |
| 387 | *message_index = decoded_results.message_index; |
| 388 | } |
| 389 | |
| 390 | /* verify the signature. We could do this before decoding the message, but |
| 391 | * we allow for the possibility of future protocol versions which use a |
| 392 | * different signing mechanism; we would rather throw "BAD_MESSAGE_VERSION" |
| 393 | * than "BAD_SIGNATURE" in this case. |
| 394 | */ |
| 395 | message_length -= ED25519_SIGNATURE_LENGTH; |
| 396 | r = _olm_crypto_ed25519_verify( |
| 397 | their_key: &session->signing_key, |
| 398 | message, message_length, |
| 399 | signature: message + message_length |
| 400 | ); |
| 401 | if (!r) { |
| 402 | session->last_error = OLM_BAD_SIGNATURE; |
| 403 | return (size_t)-1; |
| 404 | } |
| 405 | |
| 406 | max_length = megolm_cipher->ops->decrypt_max_plaintext_length( |
| 407 | megolm_cipher, |
| 408 | decoded_results.ciphertext_length |
| 409 | ); |
| 410 | if (max_plaintext_length < max_length) { |
| 411 | session->last_error = OLM_OUTPUT_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL; |
| 412 | return (size_t)-1; |
| 413 | } |
| 414 | |
| 415 | r = _get_megolm(session, message_index: decoded_results.message_index, result: &megolm); |
| 416 | if (r == (size_t)-1) { |
| 417 | return r; |
| 418 | } |
| 419 | |
| 420 | /* now try checking the mac, and decrypting */ |
| 421 | r = megolm_cipher->ops->decrypt( |
| 422 | megolm_cipher, |
| 423 | megolm_get_data(&megolm), MEGOLM_RATCHET_LENGTH, |
| 424 | message, message_length, |
| 425 | decoded_results.ciphertext, decoded_results.ciphertext_length, |
| 426 | plaintext, max_plaintext_length |
| 427 | ); |
| 428 | |
| 429 | _olm_unset(buffer: &megolm, buffer_length: sizeof(megolm)); |
| 430 | if (r == (size_t)-1) { |
| 431 | session->last_error = OLM_BAD_MESSAGE_MAC; |
| 432 | return r; |
| 433 | } |
| 434 | |
| 435 | /* once we have successfully decrypted a message, set a flag to say the |
| 436 | * session appears valid. */ |
| 437 | session->signing_key_verified = 1; |
| 438 | |
| 439 | return r; |
| 440 | } |
| 441 | |
| 442 | size_t olm_group_decrypt( |
| 443 | OlmInboundGroupSession *session, |
| 444 | uint8_t * message, size_t message_length, |
| 445 | uint8_t * plaintext, size_t max_plaintext_length, |
| 446 | uint32_t * message_index |
| 447 | ) { |
| 448 | size_t raw_message_length; |
| 449 | |
| 450 | raw_message_length = _olm_decode_base64(input: message, input_length: message_length, output: message); |
| 451 | if (raw_message_length == (size_t)-1) { |
| 452 | session->last_error = OLM_INVALID_BASE64; |
| 453 | return (size_t)-1; |
| 454 | } |
| 455 | |
| 456 | return _decrypt( |
| 457 | session, message, message_length: raw_message_length, |
| 458 | plaintext, max_plaintext_length, |
| 459 | message_index |
| 460 | ); |
| 461 | } |
| 462 | |
| 463 | size_t olm_inbound_group_session_id_length( |
| 464 | const OlmInboundGroupSession *session |
| 465 | ) { |
| 466 | return _olm_encode_base64_length(GROUP_SESSION_ID_LENGTH); |
| 467 | } |
| 468 | |
| 469 | size_t olm_inbound_group_session_id( |
| 470 | OlmInboundGroupSession *session, |
| 471 | uint8_t * id, size_t id_length |
| 472 | ) { |
| 473 | if (id_length < olm_inbound_group_session_id_length(session)) { |
| 474 | session->last_error = OLM_OUTPUT_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL; |
| 475 | return (size_t)-1; |
| 476 | } |
| 477 | |
| 478 | return _olm_encode_base64( |
| 479 | input: session->signing_key.public_key, GROUP_SESSION_ID_LENGTH, output: id |
| 480 | ); |
| 481 | } |
| 482 | |
| 483 | uint32_t olm_inbound_group_session_first_known_index( |
| 484 | const OlmInboundGroupSession *session |
| 485 | ) { |
| 486 | return session->initial_ratchet.counter; |
| 487 | } |
| 488 | |
| 489 | int olm_inbound_group_session_is_verified( |
| 490 | const OlmInboundGroupSession *session |
| 491 | ) { |
| 492 | return session->signing_key_verified; |
| 493 | } |
| 494 | |
| 495 | size_t olm_export_inbound_group_session_length( |
| 496 | const OlmInboundGroupSession *session |
| 497 | ) { |
| 498 | return _olm_encode_base64_length(SESSION_EXPORT_RAW_LENGTH); |
| 499 | } |
| 500 | |
| 501 | size_t olm_export_inbound_group_session( |
| 502 | OlmInboundGroupSession *session, |
| 503 | uint8_t * key, size_t key_length, uint32_t message_index |
| 504 | ) { |
| 505 | uint8_t *raw; |
| 506 | uint8_t *ptr; |
| 507 | Megolm megolm; |
| 508 | size_t r; |
| 509 | size_t encoded_length = olm_export_inbound_group_session_length(session); |
| 510 | |
| 511 | if (key_length < encoded_length) { |
| 512 | session->last_error = OLM_OUTPUT_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL; |
| 513 | return (size_t)-1; |
| 514 | } |
| 515 | |
| 516 | r = _get_megolm(session, message_index, result: &megolm); |
| 517 | if (r == (size_t)-1) { |
| 518 | return r; |
| 519 | } |
| 520 | |
| 521 | /* put the raw data at the end of the output buffer. */ |
| 522 | raw = ptr = key + encoded_length - SESSION_EXPORT_RAW_LENGTH; |
| 523 | *ptr++ = SESSION_EXPORT_VERSION; |
| 524 | |
| 525 | // Encode message index as a big endian 32-bit number. |
| 526 | for (unsigned i = 0; i < 4; i++) { |
| 527 | *ptr++ = 0xFF & (message_index >> 24); message_index <<= 8; |
| 528 | } |
| 529 | |
| 530 | memcpy(dest: ptr, megolm_get_data(&megolm), MEGOLM_RATCHET_LENGTH); |
| 531 | ptr += MEGOLM_RATCHET_LENGTH; |
| 532 | |
| 533 | memcpy( |
| 534 | dest: ptr, src: session->signing_key.public_key, |
| 535 | ED25519_PUBLIC_KEY_LENGTH |
| 536 | ); |
| 537 | ptr += ED25519_PUBLIC_KEY_LENGTH; |
| 538 | |
| 539 | return _olm_encode_base64(input: raw, SESSION_EXPORT_RAW_LENGTH, output: key); |
| 540 | } |
| 541 | |